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Does China have a Foreign Policy?
Domestic Pressures and 
China’s Strategy
Jonathan Fenby 
As China approaches its wholesale change of leadership staring later this year it faces as wide a set of challenges as any country on earth. The scale and speed of its material rise over the last three 
decades has been such that it is all too easy to overlook what has not been done, and to exaggerate 
the extent to which the People’s Republic (PRC) is ready to become the dominant global force. 
The idea of China’s exceptionalism, the notion that it has forged a new, self-sustaining model has a lot 
of holes in it; indeed, some of China’s top leaders, including the outgoing Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, 
admit to its fl aws. That will not deter those who welcome the prospect of the last major state of earth 
ruled by a Communist Party overtaking the United States as the most infl uential player on the world 
scene. But, as Guy de Jonquières shows in his paper, the PRC has to be viewed in a context of global 
interdependence. 
Chinese leaders are well aware of this; hence, for instance, their concern about a recession in Europe 
and its effect on exports. But their greatest concerns are domestic. Political reform is on the back burner 
and, given that it would entail the Communist Party submitting itself to external controls, legal reform is 
unlikely to make much progress in a nation where rule by law has always prevailed over the rule of law, 
and where the draconian gospel of Legalism has lain within the softer glove of Confucianism. The main 
debate is instead about economic reform and the extent to which the need to re-shape and re-balance 
the economy will affect existing structures and the position of vested interest groups. 
FRAGMENTED POLICY MAKING
In this context, foreign policy takes a secondary position in the PRC’s priorities, and is complicated by 
the involvement of different power centres. The Foreign Ministry appears weak. State Councillor Dai 
Bingguo, who derives his authority from the Communist Party’s Leading Group on Foreign Affairs, 
outranks Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. A constellation of interest groups affects policy, including the 
powerful Commerce Ministry; state-owned enterprises; the energy and metals lobbies; the security and 
ideological arms of the Party, which want to keep ‘harmful’ foreign infl uences at bay; and the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA).
At fi rst sight, it may appear that China has quite a clear approach to the world. It has defi ned its ‘core 
interests’, including the preservation of its existing political and economic system, and territorial unity 
that includes Tibet and Xinjiang and the claim to Taiwan. Linked to this, it upholds non-interference in 
the internal affairs affairs of sovereign states. It pursues a ‘resource diplomacy’ aimed at ensuring the 
supply of raw materials. For much of the period of growth since the end of the 1970s, it has applied 
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Deng Xiaoping’s doctrine of ‘biding time and hiding 
one’s talents’ in international affairs while building 
up the economy, and avoiding causing alarm among 
developed nations which it needs both as export 
markets and as a source of technological investment.
But this collection of separate interests contains 
internal contradictions and hardly constitutes the 
foreign policy of a great power. All this leads to the 
question of whether Beijing has a coherent foreign 
policy or, rather, a series of different agendas pursued 
at different times in different ways by different actors. 
In international security, Beijing’s see-saw line over 
Libya saw it refuse to veto the no-fl y zone and then 
subsequently upbraid France for taking action against 
Gaddafi . Syria has provided another example of China’s 
hesitant diplomacy, as it struggles to reconcile its 
interests and sovereigntism with its position as a 
system-making great power. As for resources, it is 
unclear that the pursuit of yet more agreements 
on the supply of minerals and oil can be pursued 
without strategic implications. At some point Chinese 
investment, notably in Africa but increasingly also in 
Latin America, will take on a political aspect as local 
populations raise questions about the PRC’s presence. 
When it comes to the international fi nancial system, 
Beijing speaks of the need for reform and bridles at 
the domination of Western nations. But it is yet to 
present an alternative programme beyond the call for 
greater use of Special Drawing Rights by the Governor 
of the central bank, which one source says was not 
authorised by the government and faces huge diffi culty 
in being accepted. Its currency policy is dominated by 
domestic concerns. On the wider global stage, China 
may be seen as the leading member of the  BRIC 
nations, but their collective inability to act as one in 
a positive direction was shown most recently by their 
failure to line up behind a common candidate to 
compete with the US nomination for the Presidency 
of the World Bank.
THE PACIFIC PIVOT
Over the past two years, China’s regional conduct in 
East Asia has led to tension with neighbours and to 
Washington deciding to pursue a policy of a ‘Pacifi c 
pivot’, strengthening its security presence and seeking 
wider trading arrangements. This can hardly be 
to Beijing’s taste, but the PRC has brought much 
of this on itself with the series of incidents pitting 
Chinese boats against vessels from Japan, South Korea, 
Vietnam and the Philippines – plus strong rhetoric from 
hawks in Beijing and a minor military build-up round 
the South China Sea. The Obama administration has 
predictably seized the opportunity to raise the United 
States’ profi le in the Pacifi c, leading to modulation of 
Chinese policy which, however, shows signs of fi ssure 
before it has been properly implemented.
The PRC presents itself as anxious to step up 
cooperation in East Asia. But its fi shing trawlers have 
been involved in a succession of maritime incidents 
with other regional nations, as shown in fi gure 1. Some 
have taken place off the coasts of Japan and South 
Korea, and China has an ongoing dispute with Japan 
over ownership of a group of uninhabited islands in the 
East China Sea. However, the focus for most of these 
disputes is the 1.3 million square mile South China 
Sea through which 60,000 ships pass each year. The 
Sea is estimated to provide 10 percent of the world’s 
supply of fi sh and also contains rocky islets that may 
sit on top of valuable oil and gas reserves. 
On the basis of a map dating from 1947, the PRC insists 
that it has sovereignty over the whole South China Sea. 
However Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Taiwan have claims too. The 
main confrontation is between China and Vietnam 
and the Philippines. Vietnam claims that its exclusive 
economic zone stretches 200 nautical miles from its 
coast, and has granted Exxon-Mobil a licence to explore 
three offshore oil blocks. India’s state-owned Oil and 
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) is also planning 
to drill in a block off Danang, leading the Foreign 
Ministry in Beijing to warn that ‘any foreign company 
that engages in oil-exploration activity in waters 
under China’s jurisdiction without the agreement 
of China has violated China’s sovereignty, rights and 
interests. This is illegal and invalid.’ Although Japan and 
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South Korea are not claimants to the sea, nearly all 
their oil imports arrive by that route and Japanese 
fi rms are exploring for oil off Vietnam. 
China’s three regional naval fleets held joint 
manoeuvres in the South China Sea for the fi rst time 
last year. To the north, where Beijing and Tokyo dispute 
ownership of the Rikuyu Islands in the Yellow Sea, 
Japan, Taiwan and the US have all reported Chinese 
submarines at increasing distances from the Mainland. 
China’s navy sent 10 vessels into the Pacifi c through the 
strait between Okinawa and the island of Miyako for 
exercises in June, and the Defence Ministry announced 
in November that the navy would conduct regular 
exercises in the western Pacifi c. Chinese coast guard 
craft have stepped up patrols in disputed waters and 
China began to fl y PLA surveillance drones over the 
East China Sea close to the Korean coast at the end of 
November. Beijing dispatched a ‘fi shing enforcement 
ship’ to the disputed Paracel Islands in September 
2011 in order to ‘safeguard maritime sovereignty and 
fi sheries interests’. 
On the diplomatic front, China temporarily cut off 
top-level contacts with Tokyo, and continues to restrict 
supplies of rare earth minerals to Japan following 
the arrest of a Chinese trawler captain in a clash 
with coast guards in 2010. The state news agency, 
Xinhua, greeted the appointment of Yoshihiko Noda 
as Japan’s Prime Minister last September with a list 
of instructions to respect PRC interests, especially 
over disputed islands, to ‘acknowledge China’s 
legitimate requirement for military modernisation to 
defend its growing national interests’ and to ‘stop 
viewing China as a threat and call off the dangerous 
practice of invoking China’s rise as an excuse…
for military expansion’. 
CHINA’S MILITARY BUILDUP
These confrontations come as the PLA is steadily 
building up its military spending with double digit 
increases in annual budgets. China accounts for 6.2 
percent of global military spending, compared to 43 
percent for the US, which is far ahead technologically. 
The PLA is working on a stealth aircraft, anti-satellite 
rockets and improved communications systems, but 
the main thrust of expansion has been at sea, where 
China currently has only 80 surface vessels (including 
a single aircraft carrier) and 70 submarines. Hu Jintao 
underlined the navy’s role when he called in early 
December for it to ‘make extended preparations for 
military combat’. A base for attack and ballistic missile 
nuclear-powered submarines has been built at Sanya 
on Hainan Island. An anti-ship missile that NATO dubs 
‘the Sizzler’ and that can be launched from submerged 
submarines is reported to fl y at three times the speed 
of sound over a 200-mile range. Another missile, the 
Dongfeng, is being developed to hit an aircraft carrier 
2,000 miles away. The fl eet air arm is being expanded 
to 200 aircraft. 
Though the Mainland insists on its ‘peaceful rise’ 
and prefers ‘asymmetrical’ strategy to an arms race 
with the US, PLA hawks regularly rattle their sabres. 
General Liu Yuan, Political Commissar of the General 
Logistics Department and a Communist Party Central 
Committee member, wrote last year that ‘history is 
written by blood and slaughter’. The main nationalist 
voice, the Communist Party tabloid Global Times, has 
called Vietnam and the Philippines ‘little countries’ 
which should ‘get ready to hear the sound of gunfi re’ if 
they dispute Chinese sovereignty over the South China 
Sea. The headline of an editorial in the newspaper 
read ‘China Cannot Resort Only to Negotiations Over 
Maritime Confl icts, We Must Kill One to Deter One 
Hundred If Necessary.’ 
No one should doubt China’s desire to expand its 
naval presence in East Asia and to break through 
the island chain stretching from the south of Japan 
through Taiwan to the Philippines. Xinhua has added 
a claim to the whole of the South China Sea to the 
list of the PRC’s ‘core interests’; and the People’s 
Daily, the main Communist Party mouthpiece, wrote 
on 23 November 2011 that ‘there is no international 
water in the South China Sea’. Global Times warns 
of the threat of ‘East Asian countries benefi ting from 
economic cooperation with China as much as possible 
while containing China’s infl uences by either joining 
with the US or forcing China to make concessions 
on disputed issues’. General Luo Yuan of the PLA 
Academy of Military Science has said that Washington 
is pursuing a containment policy towards the PRC and 
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Table 1:   Maritime clashes involving Chinese vessels, 2010-12
Date/countries 
involved      
Nature of incident                        Outcome
April 2012
Philippines
 Philippines naval vessels confront Chinese 
trawlers in waters claimed by Manila. 
Chinese withdrew. 
December 2011
Japan 
Coast Guards arrest Chinese trawler captain for 
fi shing in Japanese waters. 
Muted Chinese response, with 
consul in Nagasaki calling for 
safety of Chinese fi shermen to 
be respected. 
December 2011
South Korea 
Chinese trawler captain stabbed South Korean 
coast guard offi cer to death after a fi shing boat 
was boarded 55 miles off South Korea’s coast. 
Unresolved. 
November 2011
South Korea 
South Korean Coast Guards seized a Chinese 
fi shing boat and its crew for poaching inside 
South Korea’s exclusive economic zone off 
Cheju Island. When a fl eet of 25 Chinese boats 
gathered to demand its release, two more 
Chinese fi shermen were detained. 
Boats and men still being held. 
November 2011
Philippines 
China tells Philippines to halt oil and gas 
exploration 50 miles off Palawan province. 
Manila refuses, saying the area 
is within its waters. 
November 2011
Japan 
Japan arrested a Chinese fi shing boat captain for 
refusing inspection in Japanese territorial waters. 
Captain released. 
July 2011
Vietnam-India 
A PLA vessel issued a radio warning to an Indian 
navy ship after its port visit to Vietnam. 
Beijing later denied 
the incident. 
June 2011
Vietnam 
Chinese patrol boats seized equipment and fi sh 
from Vietnamese trawlers. 
Vietnam protested. Anti-Chinese 
demonstrations in Hanoi. 
May 2011
Vietnam 
Hanoi said Chinese patrol boats harassed 
PetroVietnam exploration vessel and cut its 
cables 120 nautical miles off Vietnamese coast. 
No response from China. 
March-May 
2011
Philippines 
Manila reported maritime clashes with Chinese 
boats including harassment of one of its 
exploration ships off the Spratley Islands. PRC 
patrol boats and a Philippines-licensed oil survey 
ship played cat-and-mouse for two days in 
international waters. Manila reported Chinese 
construction work on Mischief Reef in waters 
claimed by the Philippines. 
Manila protested. China gave 
assurances of goodwill to President 
Aquino when he visited China. 
March 2011
South Korea 
A Chinese fi shing boat rammed a South Korean 
coast guard patrol vessel, injuring several 
offi cers. The two crews fought with axes and 
shovels and the South Koreans shot one of the 
Chinese fi shermen in the leg. 
The Chinese boat escaped. 
September 2010
Japan 
A Chinese trawler clashed with Japanese Coast 
Guard boats off uninhabited islands in the East 
China Sea claimed by both nations. The arrest of 
the ship’s captain led to a diplomatic row, with 
demonstrations in China. 
Captain released.
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calls the US ‘a deliberate spoiler, fi shing in troubled 
waters’. Xinhua has also accused Washington of 
seeking to impose Cold War dominance in the region. 
This leads some American commentators, such as 
Robert Kaplan of the Center for a New American 
Security, to depict China as an expansionist power 
akin to Germany before the First World War, as it banks 
on US decline in order to enable it to project its power. 
The reality is that China knows its military limitations 
and increasingly recognises the economic benefi ts to 
be gained from softer diplomacy. As Admiral Mike 
Mullen, the outgoing Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, has said, Beijing’s aim is to increase ‘access 
denial’ to American forces in the region rather than 
to seek confrontation. Beijing may not relish the 
prospect but its policymakers know that the US will 
remain the principal military power in East Asia and 
that any serious attempt to challenge it will only drive 
other countries further into its arms. 
This can be seen from the way that both Vietnam 
and the Philippines strengthened military links with 
Washington after incidents earlier this year. In the 
face of China’s new assertiveness, Japan and ASEAN 
agreed at the end of September 2011 to formalise 
maritime security cooperation. The South China Sea 
was at the core of talks in late October between 
President Aquino of the Philippines and Vietnam’s 
new President, Truong Tan Sang. A US congressional 
delegation visited the Philippines in the autumn to 
discuss how Washington could bolster its defence 
needs. Japan’s Deputy Minister of Defence Kimito 
Nakae said tensions over the South China Sea would 
require more cooperation with the US and India. Japan 
and the Philippines have affi rmed their nations’ security 
links in a ‘strategic partnership’, and the Philippines 
brought into service its largest ship, a 3,400-tonne 
cutter acquired from the US, which was deployed in 
the confrontation with Chinese trawlers in April, 2012. 
Manila plans to buy one more similar craft as well as 
acquiring second-hand fi ghter jets from Washington. 
Meanwhile Taiwan is strengthening the defence of 
one of the Spratley Islands that it holds. 
Vietnam is due to get six Kilo-class submarines from 
Russia, which also supplied it with two Gepard-class 
guided-missile frigates this year. Hanoi is negotiating 
for two more frigates, with anti-submarine weapons. 
It also has two batteries of Russian Bastion land-based 
anti-ship cruise missiles and an undisclosed number 
of Sukhoi Su-30 jet fi ghters. Vietnam signed its fi rst 
defence agreement with the US this year. The US 
aircraft carrier George Washington paid port visits 
to Vietnam this year and American naval ships have 
been repaired recently in Cam Ranh Bay. 
RE-ENTER THE US 
Having drawn the conclusion that China’s assertive 
approach was proving counterproductive, the Obama 
administration embarked on a forward policy to show 
that, in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s words, ‘the 
21st century will be America’s Pacifi c century’. It has 
stepped up military cooperation with Vietnam and the 
Philippines and is starting to base troops in Darwin, 
Australia – only 250 at fi rst but increasing to 2,500 
over an unspecifi ed timeframe. Japan is buying F-35 
fi ghters from the US and, in December 2011, the State 
Department announced that Japan, India and the US 
had held the fi rst of a series of trilateral security talks 
on Asian and global issues. All three nations took 
initiatives at the end of the year to improve relations 
with China’s client state Burma, including a visit there 
by Hillary Clinton, the fi rst by a US Secretary of State 
in 50 years. 
Furthermore, President Obama used the East Asian 
summit in Bali in November 2011 to relaunch the 
Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP), a proposal for a free-
trade zone fi rst mooted by Washington in 2009. Only 
four Pacifi c nations – Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and 
Singapore – have signed up to the TPP while Australia, 
Malaysia, Vietnam and Peru are negotiating for 
membership. Japan has said that it will join in talks on 
the scheme, but as it stands, the proposal looks more 
like a rhetorical device with an anti-China message 
than a serious new option for regional economic 
relations. The ‘fast-track’ trade negotiating authority 
that the administration would require seems unlikely 
to be forthcoming from Congress in an election year 
when defence of jobs will be a major campaign issue, 
and when important union supporters of the Obama 
campaign are hostile towards the proposal. Even if 
the US did join, the other eight countries, without 
Japan, encompass only fi ve percent of US trade, and in 
spite of its close relationship with Washington, Japan 
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is unlikely to participate because of opposition from 
its farmers and small businesses. The South Korean 
government is already having trouble getting its free-
trade agreement with the US through the National 
Assembly. As for China, US National Security Adviser 
Tom Donilon made plain in an article in the Financial 
Times that the TPP would be run as Washington 
wished, insisting on ‘high standards including on 
matters of intellectual property, labour and state-
owned enterprises’. 
CHINA’S DIPLOMACY TURNS
The PRC may not have too much to fear on the 
economic front. But it has clearly taken note of the 
hostile reaction its assertive behaviour has produced 
and has shifted to a more placatory approach. When 
the Japanese Coast Guard arrested a Chinese trawler 
captain for trespassing in Japan’s fi shing grounds 
at the end of 2011, China’s response was limited 
to a statement by its consul in Nagasaki urging the 
authorities to ensure the safety of Chinese fi shermen 
and to respect their legal rights – a sharp contrast 
with the top-level anger displayed in 2010. Similarly, 
its diplomatic protest when two local legislators from 
Okinawa visited disputed islands – known as Senkaku 
in Japan and Diaoyu in China – in January 2012 had 
a pro forma air to it. 
At the East Asia summit conference in Bali in November 
2011, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao bowed to pressure 
from other participants to have a multilateral discussion 
of the South China Sea rather than sticking to China’s 
previous insistence that it would talk only bilaterally. 
The clash with Vietnamese vessels off Danang in 
summer 2011 was followed by a scheduled economic 
cooperation conference. Then Xi Jinping, the anointed 
next leader of the PRC, visited Vietnam in late 
December for talks at which, according to the Chinese, 
both sides agreed to work towards a consensus on 
the South China Sea. 
Meeting in Beijing on Christmas Day, Wen Jiabao 
and Yoshihiko Noda agreed to promote direct 
trading of the yen and the renminbi without using 
dollars, and the Japanese delegation confi rmed that 
Japan would apply to buy Chinese bonds in 2012. 
Concern about the stability of North Korea following 
the death of Kim Jong-il overshadows the anger in 
South Korea at the killing of a coast guard offi cer 
by a Chinese trawler captain in a maritime clash in 
mid-December. The deputy foreign ministers of the 
two countries held talks at the end of December with 
China’s Zhang Zhijun calling for closer communication 
between the two countries to address the ‘dynamics 
of the Asia-Pacific region’ that were becoming 
‘complicated and serious’. Seoul’s nuclear envoy Lim 
Sung-nam went to Beijing at the end of last year to 
discuss resumption of the stalled six-party talks on 
North Korea’s nuclear programme, and at the same 
time, a state visit to China in 2012 by South Korean 
President Lee Myung-bak was announced. 
The perennial tensions over Taiwan have eased since 
the Kuomintang returned to power in 2008, and 
the Mainland has pursued a softer approach that 
has brought the Republic of China increasingly into 
its fold. Prospects for the January 2012 Taiwanese 
presidential election have been clouded by the third-
party candidacy of James Song of the People First 
Party, to challenge the incumbent Ma Ying-jeou and 
Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). 
Ma is still expected to win re-election, but even if Tsai 
defeats him, cross-Strait relations will probably not 
experience the tensions seen after the DPP victory of 
2000. The Obama administration has made the limits 
of its backing for the island evident in its restrictions 
on sales of state-of-the art weaponry. Washington will 
continue its opposition to calls for independence for 
the island and stick to the ambiguous ‘One China’ 
policy adopted in the 1970s and embraced by Ma as 
well as by the PRC. 
THE CONFLICTING STRANDS
China’s new leadership under Xi Jinping, which 
takes over from this autumn, cannot turn its back on 
nationalist sentiment, and there is always the possibility 
of a military miscalculation. With the prospect of 
falling exports to the West, Beijing will be reluctant 
to do anything that could jeopardise the growth of 
its economic ties with East Asia. At the same time, 
however, Beijing fi nds itself caught on its own rhetoric, 
especially regarding its claim to the South China Sea as 
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shown by the clash with the Philippines in the spring 
of 2012. Despite the diplomatic efforts seen earlier, 
this escalated rapidly with President Benigno Aquino 
calling on ASEAN countries to take a common stand 
against Beijing and warning that they should all fear 
‘what is transpiring’ in terms of the PRC’s maritime 
claims. This followed an editorial in Global Times 
which wrote of a potential ‘small-scale war’ to end 
the standoff, adding that ‘Once the war erupts, China 
must take resolute action to deliver a clear message 
to the outside world it does not want a war, but 
defi nitely has no fear of it’.
The combination of continuing assertiveness and 
tactical diplomatic pull-backs is symptomatic of a 
foreign policy that is subject to different pressures and 
appears to lack overall direction. Some may minimise 
the examples given above as being simply regional 
matters that do not affect the wider global picture, 
but they suggest that – even in its own backyard – 
Beijing lacks strategic coherence. That may reassure 
states which would fear a determined, co-ordinated 
Chinese approach, but it also opens up the possibility 
of miscalculations and, by its nature, makes dealing 
with the PRC more diffi cult. Despite the many works 
celebrating Chinese statecraft handed down through 
the centuries, it is hardly a sign of maturity on the 
part of the revived superpower.■
 
